Recent work has proposed the Lempel-Ziv Jaccard Distance (LZJD) as a method to measure the similarity between binary byte sequences for malware classification. We propose and test LZJD's effectiveness as a similarity digest hash for digital forensics. To do so we develop a high performance Java implementation with the same command-line arguments as sdhash, making it easy to integrate into existing work-flows. Our testing shows that LZJD is effective for this task, and significantly outperforms sdhash and ssdeep in its ability to match related file fragments and is faster at comparison time.
Introduction
In forensic investigations of IT environments, there has been a long recognized and ever increasing need to find similar files. Initial triage and screening of data can easily enter terabytes of data, collected from email archives, hard drives, USB peripherals, and network traffic [1] . Such needs occur in many other areas as well, such as firmware analysis [2] and malware triage [3, 4] .
Finding similar files is often a daunting task, since manual inspection can take hours per file, if possible at all. The need to automate this task has lead to the development of many similarity digests or "hashes" [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . Similar to a cryptographic hash function like MD5 or SHA1, these digests convert an arbitrary sequence of bytes into a shorter identifying byte sequence. However, whereas a hash function like MD5 is designed to produce dramatically different output for even a one byte change in the input, these similarity digests are designed to produce little if any change in output given a small change in input. By making the similarity hash insensitive to changes in the input, we can compare the hashes themselves as a method of comparing the similarity of two files.
The two most popular and well known similarity hashes are ssdeep [8] and sdhash [10] , which have become the standard benchmarks in the field. While ssdeep is often ineffective for many data types, it is readily available and one of the fastest hashing methods in use. In particular, ssdeep is sensitive to byte ordering, which is a weakness for formats that support arbitrary re-ordering of contents (such as binary executable files). While sdhash is slower than ssdeep, it makes up for runtime performance loss with significantly improved matching and detection ability and is considered state-of-the-art in this regard [11] . The sdhash program's improved matching and detection is the result of resolving the byte reordering weakness of ssdeep, and it uses empirically derived thresholds to detect "unlikely" features that can be used for effective matching. However, both of these methods are predominantly heuristic in nature, and don't always produce symmetric similarity results (i.e., sim(A, B) = sim(B, A)) [12] . This also makes the scores returned by these methods difficult to interpret, and the "threshold" for similarity must be empirically determined. This may be in part because the digests have been designed to detect "identicalness", rather than measuring a degree of similarity [13] .
In this work, we propose the recently developed Lempel-Ziv Jaccard Distance (LZJD) [14] as an alternative similarity digest. The LZJD was developed for malware analysis, a related field that is particularly challenging due to the arbitrary degrees of freedom available to a malware author. LZJD's success in the area of malware analysis suggests that it may be a useful alternative to sdhash for digital forensic investigations.
In this work we will show three primary benefits of using LZJD as a similarity digest. First, the time it takes to compare two hashes is orders of magnitude faster with LZJD compared to sdhash, which is critical when dealing with large signature indexes. Second, the LZJD score can in practice be interpreted as a lower bound on how similar the binary contents of two files are. This interoperability is not present in current digest methods. Third, LZJD is better at matching a file fragment with its source file (i.e., the source file receives the highest matching score compared to all other files) compared to both ssdeep and sdhash. We suspect that LZJD sets a new state-of-the-art in this regard. Fourth, the digest size of LZJD is fixed, making the determination of index size trivial.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We will introduce the reader to LZJD and its design in section 2. In doing so we will give our interpretation of the LZJD approach that leads us to believe it will make an effective similarity digest. Since efficient execution time is critical to tool adoption and use, we detail how we develop a faster version of LZJD in section 3, and compare results to the original LZJD work to confirm that our approach has no loss in accuracy while obtaining higher throughput. These tests will also include ssdeep and sdhash to show LZJD's superiority in a related domain, and a significant failure case for sdhash. Given our new efficient LZJD, we evaluate it's abilities as a similarity digest in section 4 using the FRASH framework [15] . We will discuss the meaning and importance of our results in section 5, followed by our conclusion in section 6.
Background, LZJD
The inspiration for LZJD comes from the Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) [16] . The NCD is a metric based on the Kolmogorov complexity function K(·), which returns the length of the shortest possible program that could produce a given input string. In measuring the similarity between two byte sequences a and b, if a has no relationship to b then information about a will not allow us to write a smaller program that produces b. Conversely, if a and b are very similar, a program that produces a can also produce b with only a small additional amount of code. The amount of code needed to produce a and b together rather than independently, is used to measure the similarity of the sequences.
However, the Kolmogorov function K(·) is uncomputable, so an approximation must be used. For the NCD, it was proposed to use any arbitrary compression function C(·), which would return the length in bytes of the compressed input. The resulting distance function is given in (1), where xy indicates the concatenation of strings x and y.
Given the widespread availability of compression algorithms, this NCD function is easy to implement in practice. Yet its execution time is hampered by the large amount of time needed to perform compression. The effectiveness of the compression algorithm also has a direct impact on the accuracy of NCD, and the most effective compression schemes often have the greatest run-times. In addition to this computational burden, NCD has a number of practical issues despite theoretical assurances. It has difficulty with high entropy sequences, can produce values larger than the theoretical maximum similarity of 1, and lacks symmetry (which also breaks the distance metric properties) [17, 18, 19] .
NCD did find use in the domain of malware analysis, where it was found that LZMA based algorithms performed best [20, 19] . The malware domain often has no obvious or "best" features for general use, and the changing nature of malware over time means that these features can change as well. This makes a method like NCD useful in its flexibility, since no features need to be specified or extracted, and it can work on raw binary contents. However, the lackluster runtime performance of LZMA in NCD limited its use to around 10,000 datapoints or less.
Inspired by NCD, and noting that the LZMA compression based schemes usually performed best, LZJD was developed to circumvent the performance issues of NCD [14] . LZJD follows a simple process: First, LZJD converts a byte sequence b into a set of sub-sequences s b , using a simplified version of the Lempel-Ziv 77 algorithm (LZ77) [21, 14] . This simplified version of LZ77 is presented in Algorithm 1.
start ← end 10: end ← end + 1 11: return s
We review the details of the LZ77 approach used, as they are important to both our interpretation of score results and in improving the runtime performance of LZJD. This method works by building a set of previously seen sequences from the given byte sequence b. The set starts out empty, and a pointer starts at the beginning of the file looking for a sub-sequence of length one. If the pointer is looking at a sub-sequence that has been seen before, we leave it in place and increase the desired sub-sequence length by one. If the pointer is at a sub-sequence that has not been seen before, it is added to the set. Then the pointer is moved to the next position after the subsequence, and the desired sub-sequence length reset to one. Repeating this until no new items can be added to the set, and return the constructed set. The sequences in the set will get progressively longer as the length of the input increases.
Once we have sets of sub-sequences for each binary of interest, we measure the similarity of the two sequences using the Jaccard similarity (2)
However, this alone is not as fast as desired. So a faster LZJD h was introduced [14] to compute approximate similarities. This was done by exploiting the fact that the Jaccard similarity can be computed approximately from a smaller digest produced from the original sets [22, 23] . In particular, if h(·) is a hash function, LZJD h uses the k smallest hash values as a proxy-set for the original ones, as shown below
Where h n min (A) indicates the n'th smallest hash value from the set A. This approximation probabilistically bounds the error at a rate of O(1/ √ k), and the LZJD paper uses k = 1024 to get an error rate of ≈ 3%. For the purposes of producing a similarity digest, we note that this hashing scheme makes an excellent candidate for a similarity digest that can be used in the same vein as ssdeep and sdhash. The digest has the benefit of being a fixed maximum size, regardless of the size of the input. This constant digest size can help reduce the size of the complete database. The theoretical grounding from [22, 23] also gives us confidence in comparing fixed length digests produced from variable sized sets.
We argue that the grounding in Jaccard similarity approximations is also more interpretable than the scores produced by ssdeep and sdhash. Since LZJD is measuring the number of shared dictionary entries produced by LZSet, we can loosely interpret this as the amount of bytes that are similar. For example, we can infer that a similarity of 0.75 between two inputs a and b indicates that a and b share approximately 75% of their LZSet, and thus 75% of their byte contents. This is not an exact measure of byte content similarity, and will be impacted by two primary factors. First, that the hashing of sub-sequences does not attempt to maintain information about sequence length. We expect this to be approximate to the average sequence length over many hashes, but this will introduce variability in the scores. Second, that the LZ dictionary creation can be impacted by the contents of the binary, so it is possible to produce different sets for similar inputs. We will see that this issue dues impact the score returned, but does not seem to reduce the matching ability of LZJD. We also note that sdhash has a similar issue where inputs can be modified by an adversary to reduce the matching score [24] , but has found widespread use regardless. So we do not believe this potential shortcoming would be a hindrance in practice.
Ultimately, the LZJD h similarity/distance performed orders of magnitude faster than NCD, with equal or better accuracy, on several malware datasets for both malware detection (correctly labeling a binary as benign or malicious) and malware family detection (finding the correct malware family for a known malicious binary). This success, combined with its use of a fixed-length digest for faster distance computations, inspires our hypothesis that it could be successfully used for the same kind of digital forensic scenarios as ssdeep and sdhash. We evaluate this feasibility in section 4. But first, we must further improve the runtime efficiency of LZJD to make it practical for this application.
A Faster LZJD Implementation
We now review the high level details of the original LZJD implementation, and discuss our modifications that result in a faster variant appropriate for the forensic use case. This implementation is in Java, and we note that both ssdeep and sdhash are written in C/C++. This may mean that there is still room for improved performance of our new LZJD implementation. We have made both a Java 1 and C++ 2 version of this faster LZJD available to the public. The program has the same command line arguments as sdhash in order to facilitate integration with existing work flows.
The original version of LZJD was a rather naive Java implementation. The set s in Algorithm 1 was a simple HashSet of ByteBuffers. A ByteBuffer object represents a byte sequence. This choice meant that equality comparisons had to compare each byte in each buffer, which would take time linear with respect to the current sub-sequence under consideration. Furthermore, and to the detriment of performance, these comparisons force the hash of the sequence to be re-computed at every step, resulting in redundant work.
Once the set of ByteBuffers was obtained, the MD5 hash of each member in the set was computed and the lower 32 bits used for the min-hashing. This set of integers was then sorted, and the minimum k integers created the final set used for the faster LZJD h . The MD5 function was chosen to ensure even distribution of hash values, which are the result of its properties as a cryptographic hash function.
To make our faster variant of LZJD, which we will denote as LZJD f for this section, we will give up on some of the exactness of the original implementation. We will present tests in subsection 3.1 that show these modifications do not degrade the accuracy of LZJD but do significantly reduce the runtime cost.
We do this by performing hashing continuously as data is read in, and representing every sub-sequence by the hashed integer counterpart. By using a hash that we updated with one byte at a time, we no longer need to read the entire file into memory for LZJD f to work. This may result in false collisions during the LZ set construction as two hashes may collide to the same integer, but we believe the cost of such collisions to be minimal. The LZ algorithm will simply continue processing the next byte, which is now a new sub-sequence that is one byte longer. It is necessary that this new sub-sequence does not currently exist in the set, because the previous set did not either. For the new sub-sequence to also have a collision becomes astronomically unlikely, assuming the hashes are uniformly distributed. Even if several collisions occurred, the impact on the output similarity should be minimal, as the sub-sequences of each sub-sequence are also in the sets and included in the comparison. That is to say, if the sub-sequence "abcdefg" is not included in the set due to a hash collision, the contributions of "abcdef", "abcde", etc., are still present.
To make sure these hash values are of a high quality, but avoiding the unnecessary quality of a cryptographic hash function like MD5, we use the MurmurHash3 3 function. This hash function is designed to have an even distribution of hashes and require minimal CPU time for computation. While not originally designed for it, we re-implement this algorithm so that the hash can be updated one byte at a time. This requires keeping a four-byte memory that is updated and used to compute the running hash output, in addition to the internal state of the MurmurHash3 algorithm.
We also optimize the integer set object to take advantage of the two unique artifacts of the situation. First, it only needs to support the insertion of integers, so no removals are needed. Second, since the integer values are hashes, there is no need to apply any kind of hash function to them, as they will already be evenly distributed (i.e., our hash set can use the identity function as its "hash" function). We thus adapt an open addressing scheme with double hashing [25, p. 528-529] that is normally used for a hash table. We can reduce memory use by ignoring the "value" part, and using a boolean array to indicate if an entry is free or filled, and remove logic normally needed to handle the removal of entries. The "key" alone will then act as the set entry, with an implicit null "value". This reduces memory use and execution time.
Once the entire file is processed, we will have a set of integers, which we will then convert to a list of integers. Rather than naively sorting the list, which is O(n log n), we instead apply one of many algorithms that returns us the k smallest items in O(n) time [26] . Beyond optimizing how the set of k values is obtained, we can further improve how they are stored and compared.
The original LZJD would store the set of k integers in a set object, and to compute the size of the intersection of two sets, would iterate over one set and query for its entries in the other. This results in O * (k) time complexity, but is both memory inefficient and results in random memory access that negatively impact cache and pre-fetching performance. Instead we store the k items in a sorted array, which is O(k log k), but k << n, so this sort is of minor impact. The benefit is that we can compute the intersection by doing a merge-sort like comparison of the values in 3 https://github.com/aappleby/smhasher each array. Incrementally stepping forward in one list when its value is less than another. The details are shown in Algorithm 2, and results in a non-amortized O(k) runtime for digest comparisons. Further, the dense arrays are more memory efficient, and the incremental walk through the sorted arrays will work with the hardware pre-fetching for improved performance. else
Algorithm 2 Set Intersection Size via Sorted Lists
Equal values, means item was in both 10:
pos a ← pos a + 1 12: size ← size + 1 13: return size
LZJD Speedup Results
Having specified the modifications that produce the faster LZJD f , it is important to validate that the hashing approach does not meaningfully degrade accuracy compared to the original LZJD h . To do so, we will repeat the malware family classification experiments used in [14] . The malware classification problem has been previously identified as an area whether similarity digests could be useful [11] , making this test of particular relevance in this context of similarity digest comparisons. For this reason we will also include ssdeep and sdhash in this comparison, and see that LZJD f outperforms them both.
Malware family classification can be seen as a close corollary to the digital forensics problem of finding a related file. For each malware sample, we wish to identify the family it belongs to by comparing the sample to a database of known malware. Each specimen in the same malware family is intrinsically similar, and can be seen as one unit of "sameness" for which the inter-family similarity should be higher than the similarity to any other arbitrary sample. This task is strongly correlated with matching a modified file to its original file, but can be seen as a more challenging scenario. This is because malware is often written by an active adversary which attempts to avoid detection. Metamorphic malware, which changes itself upon propagation, makes this a common and difficult scenario [27, 28] .
The two malware datasets used each have two variants of the experiment. The Microsoft malware comes from a 2015 Kaggle competition, and the data is provided and labeled by Microsoft [29] . There are 9 malware families in 10,868 files. The first variant of this dataset uses only the raw bytes of the original files, with the PE-header removed 4 . The raw binaries take 50.8 GB of storage space, and we will refer to this dataset as "Kaggle Bytes". The second variant is the disassembly produced by IDA-Pro, which is a more human-readable version of the files. This variant takes up 147GB of space, and we will refer to this dataset as "Kaggle ASM".
The second dataset is Android malware from the Drebin corpus [30] . Following [14] , we remove any malware family that had less than 40 samples. This results in a dataset with 20 malware families and 4664 samples. Android applications are normally distirbuted as APKs, which are simply zip-files. Because the compression applied by zipping the contents can impact the effectiveness of our hashes, we evaluate the dataset in two ways. One using the raw APKs ("Drebin APK"), and the other using an uncompressed tar of the APK contents ("Drebin TAR"). These variants take 6.4GB and 8.6GB respectively. Differences in performance between these two datasets can be wholly attributed to the impact of compression 5 , since it is the only source of variation between the two sets.
To evaluate all of our hashing options on this dataset, we will use 10-fold cross validation. We will use the 1nearest neighbor algorithm to classify each sample against the other folds. If the matching algorithm returns the highest similarity score for a member of the same malware family, then the algorithm correctly classified that point. For each fold we will measure the balanced accuracy [31] . The balanced accuracy gives equal total weight to each class. This is useful since the malware families are not evenly distributed, and results would be skewed upward by the most populous families. The accuracy for each method on each dataset is presented in Table 1 . Here it is easy to see that our new LZJD f does not meaningfully change the performance on these datasets compared to the original LZJD h . The largest change is an increase in standard deviation on the most difficult dataset (Drebin APK). However LZJD f has slightly higher mean accuracy and lower standard deviation on most of the datasets. This closeness in results indicates the high fidelity of our new approach, and that the simplifications in LZSet implementation do not meaningfully impact the quality of results. This gives us confidence that our changes to LZJD f will generally perform well.
Comparing both LZJD implementations to ssdheep and sdhash, we can see far superior classification accuracy. The closest either ssdeep or sdhash come to matching LZJD's performance is on the Kaggle Bytes dataset, where sdhash still trails by over 37 whole percentage points. We will see this trend of LZJD having superior matching ability repeated in section 4.
While sdhash performs better than ssdeep on the Kaggle datasets, we also see sdhash produce degenerate results on the Drebin datasets. Its scores of 5.8% and 8.3% accuracy are barely better than the 5% threshold for random guessing. When inspecting these results manually, we discovered that the root cause is related to the heuristic nature of sdhash's scoring algorithm. Sdhash ends up keying off features generally common to all of the Android samples in our corpus, producing average nearest neighbor scores of 99.7 and 99.9 for Drebin APK and Drebin TAR respectively. This use case provides credence to the desire for a more principled and interpretable score function. To evaluate the runtime of our new LZJD f , we can see the total time taken for both hashing the files and performing the nearest neighbor searches in Table 2 . As desired, we can see that LZJD f is consistently faster than LZJD h , by a factor of 3.4 to 12.9. We can further see that this total evaluation time is comparable to ssdeep, and generally two orders of magnitude faster than sdhash. These large speed advantages generally come from LZJD f being faster to compare, which we will explore further in subsection 4.1. These results support our claim that our new LZJD f is fast enough to be a practical alternative to both ssdeep and sdhash. For the remainder of the paper, we will simply refer to LZJD f as LZJD for brevity.
Similarity Hash Comparisons using FRASH
The evaluation of similarity digests is not a trivial matter. It requires a diversity of file types (that should reflect real world content) and some level of ground-truth about which files are similar to others. Roussev [9] introduced the t5 corpus for such evaluations 6 , and a manual evaluation of SDHASH was performed. The t5 corpus contains a number of different file types, summarized in Table 3 . Roussev also proposed a number of challenges for which one would want to use a similarity hash, which Breitinger et al. drew from to create the automated FRASH test suite [15] . The FRASH tests combined evaluate four desirable qualities: The FRASH suite is written in Ruby 7 , and allows for easy integration of new similarity hashing schemes. The tests are divided into two higher level sections. The first section is Efficiency, which measures only runtime properties of the hash digest. This includes the digest time, comparison time, and hash size relative to the input. Our improvements to the LZJD algorithm tackle only these quantities, which are critical when up to terabytes of data may need triaging [32, 1] . We will see that LZJD is superior to state-of-the-art sdhash in all of these efficiency metrics.
The second, and more expansive, are the Sensitivity & Robustness tests. These evaluate the ability of the hash function to perform matching under various circumstances, and the quality of the match score returned in each scenario. These tests will show that LZJD possesses a superior ability to correctly match a fragment to the correct source file, even when presented with significant byte alterations or comparatively small fragment sizes.
Below we will present and discuss the results from each of the tests in the FRASH suite. For each result we will only present a portion of the output for brevity and readability, with the algorithm getting the most successful matches shown in bold for each test. More complete results can be found in Appendix A. All tests were run on a computer running OSX version 10.10.5. With a 2.66 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 16 GB of RAM. In initial testing, the FRASH code was highly sensitive to random read/write time. Initial runs on a standard HDD resulted in runtime that would take days for as few as 20 files. For this reason, all code and data used were stored in a RAM Disk. This is a method by which a virtual disk is created on the system that acts likes any other file system, but all stored files are kept only in RAM. This avoided all issues with the random access impact on test runtime.
Efficiency
In this section we are concerned with the computational and storage efficiency of each hashing method. This is measured by computing the hash digest for every file in the t5 corpus, and creating a digest file containing every hash. Once complete, all n 2 /2 pairwise distance computations are done. This allows us to measure the runtime efficiency of the hashing process as well as the comparison of hashes, and the storage efficiency of the hash size itself. For only the efficiency tests, the SHA1 hash function is included as a benchmark for both time and space. The runtime results can be found in Table 4 , where we see the average and total time taken to hash the files of the t5 corpus. The total hashing time (second column) is measured using the Unix time command when giving the t5 corpus as the only input for each hashing implementation . The rightmost column shows how many times longer each method took to compute all hashes compared to the SHA1 hash. Here we can see that sdhash is the slowest hash function by a factor of 2.8, and that our Java LZJD implementation is 34% faster than sdhash. Ssdeep is the fastest at 23% faster than than the SHA1 algorithm, but lacks significantly in its ability to perform accurate matching once the hashes are produced.
LZJD's runtime performance is better still when we look at the time needed for comparing the hash outputs, and is over 60 times faster than sdhash in this respect, and still 3.9 times faster than ssdeep. This would indicate that LZJD would be preferable in a situation where we have many known objects of interest in a database, and need to process the contents of a new device against the known database. One might argue that having a faster digest comparison is more important than a faster digest calculation. Indeed, others have worked on building special indexes specifically to accelerate the bottleneck of comparing many digests [7] .
The time needed to hash n files is naturally an O(n) task, but comparing the n derived hashes to an existing database of m hashes is O(nm) in complexity. The latter will clearly become the dominant cost as the number of objects under consideration increases, and so we would want to minimize its base time requirements as much as possible. An example of this can be found in [2] , where sdhash and ssdeep were used on 1.2 million files extracted from firmware images. Due to the computational burden at comparison time, these hashes couldn't be applied to the entire corpus. Our results in subsection 3.1 corroborate this high comparison time cost, where we see LZJD compare favorably to both ssdeep and sdhash. LZJD's efficient digest comparison pushes back this limitation.
We observe that this issue of runtime efficiency has been noted before, and others have attempted to build more efficient indices's for specific use cases.Winter et al. [33] built an indexing scheme for the ssdeep algorithm, but ssdeep's low precision and recall limit the utility of such a tool. Breitinger et al. [34] build a more general purpose index that is compatible with sdhash, but cannot return or filter based on similarity scores or indicate which specific file as a match. This work was theoretically extended to resolve these issues [35] but still has many obstacles to overcome, perhaps the most notable being that no working implementation was tested.
LZJD provides a sound method of circumventing these issues that may be explored in future work. Since LZJD is a valid distance metric, it avails itself to more principled and existing indexing strategies that already exist for metric spaces that support O(log n) query time [36, 37, 38, 39] .
Compression
The efficiency test in FRASH also produces a set of compression results. These results are concerned with the size of the hash digest with respect to the original file sizes. All things being equal, it is preferable to have a digest that is smaller rather than larger. A smaller digest size allows for the storage and transport of larger databases, and gives some indication about the information efficiency of the digest itself. The compression results are shown in Table 5 , where the first two columns present the average length of the digest, and the average percentage of the digest size with respect to the original file. Here we can see that SHA1 and ssdeep both produce very small digests. Sdhash produces the largest digests, with an average of 10.6 KB that is usually 2.5% of the original file size. LZJD falls in a middle ground, with an average digest of 4KB, 2.65 times smaller than sdhash. By the nature of our LZJD hash, the digest size will always be 4 KB 8 . This makes LZJD especially effective for large files, with theoretical support for its method of production. However, LZJD's fixed size can also result in an overly large digest for small files, as can be seen by the maximum digest-size to original-size ratio of 10%.
Sensitivity & Robustness
We will now review the Sensitivity & Robustness tests that are a part of the FRASH framework. Tests subsubsection 4.2.1 and subsubsection 4.2.2 will run a digest comparison on only two files at a time, namely a source file and a target file. The source file will be an unaltered file from the t5 corpus. The target file will be a modified version of the source file. These tests will be measuring behavior of the scoring methods used and how they change with changes to a single file. The implicit assumption of the FRASH framework is that a higher score between two matching files is always better, all other things being equal. As we discussed in section 2, the LZJD score will be based on the amount of byte similarity -and will not attempt to reflect "match or no match" as ssdeep and sdhash do. This makes comparing the results in these tests more challenging, and we will discuss the issue of score function behavior further in section 5.
Tests subsubsection 4.2.3 and subsubsection 4.2.4 will generate a digest database from the whole t5 corpus, and then see if a target file (still a modified version of one of the t5 source files) can be correctly matched to its source. In these tests the goal is for us to correctly match a file to its source, and can be viewed as equivalent to the nearest neighbor problem we visited in section 3. These tests can be thought of as a harder variant of the task from a machine learning sense, as there is only one correct neighbor for each test point (which would be the source point), where any file from the same class would be considered correct for the tests done in section 3. We will see that LZJD presents a new state-of-the-art in matching ability, far exceeding both ssdeep and sdhash in its matching ability.
Single Common Block correlation
The Single Common Block (SCB) test is designed to determine how small a "common block" of identical content can be before a digest algorithm produces a score of zero (i.e., no commonality). This test compares only two files at a time, where each file has random byte contents. A portion of each file will be set to the same common content, and this common block will be iteratively decreased in size. This test was run 50 times with 50 different source files to extract common blocks from. In the original FRASH testing, it was found that sdhash was able to produce matches for smaller common blocks then ssdeep, but ssdeep was able to produce higher matching scores.
This particular test puts LZJD at a disadvantage, because its score does not have the same meaning as sdhash and ssdeep, and because the files are produced with completely random byte sequences. Random bytes are a weakness of LZJD in the case of matching similarity, because the LZ algorithm will begin collecting all smallest sub-sequences, which will cause a non-zero match to occur. This makes it impossible to reach the original termination case of FRASH, and we we terminate LZJD in this test after a SCB size of 16KB. Thus, when interpreting Table 6 and Table 7 , the score that has an average block size of 16 KB should be treated as the same as the zero score for sdhash and ssdeep. Inspecting the results for a 2MB total block size in Table 6 , LZJD does not do well in this particular test. LZJD is unable to produce scores in the same large ranges as sdhash and ssdeep, but LZJD is also not designed to produce such scores. The use of completely random byte sequences as the filler content of the SCB test also artificially deflates the score LZJD gives, due to the increased number of sub-sequences the Lempel-Ziv algorithm will find within these high entropy regions. The particular performance of LZJD at the lowest end of the score range is comparable to or better than sdhash, depending on which results are inspected. This can be better seen for a 512KB total block size, as shown in Table 7 . Here we can see for a score of ≥20, sdhash requires a common block that is 31% of the total block size, where LZJD requires a common block size of only 16%. The results for the 8 MB total block size follow this pattern, and can be found in Appendix A.
We again note that this test is comparing the score of only two files at a time, and is not as relevant for LZJD since it does not try to produce the same types of score values as sdhash and ssdeep. LZJD's score is best interpreted as an approximate measure of the byte similarity of two files, and in practice, we will see that it is best viewed as a low bound on the percentage of similar bytes. That is to say, if LZJD returns a score of 23, then it is relatively safe to assume that the two files share at least 23% of their byte contents with each-other.
Random-noise-resistance
The random noise test attempts to produce false negatives by randomly altering the file one byte at a time. After modification, the test records how many matches are achieved at each score and how many edits where required to reduce the score to that level. Bytes are altered via random insertions, deletions, and substitutions, and location is selected randomly.
As noted in the original FRASH paper [15] , the random noise resistance test is computationally demanding, and so we use only a random sample of 100 files from the t5 corpus. Our results find that LZJD is significantly more resistant to such alterations than either ssdeep or sdhash, which further increases the time it takes the tests to run. To reduce test runtime, after 200 edits, we begin altering the files by 10 bytes at a time. Once we reach 2000 edits, we increase to 100 edits at a time, and so on. We also add an early termination after 80% of the file is altered, due to the extreme ranges that LZJD achieves in matching.
The results of running the random noise test are shown in Table 8 , where Matches indicates how many files achieved a given match score, and Avg. changes is the average amount of bytes that needed to be altered for this score to appear, as a percentage of that file's size. For example, ssdeep was able to get a score equal to or higher than 70 for only 88 of the 100 files tested. It only took changing 0.005% of the byte contents of a file to lower the score of ssdeep to this level. The better an algorithm's resistance to noise, the more we should be able to alter a file and still obtain a relatively high score. Because ssdeep and sdhash desire to produce a maximal score for any match, we would want to see a maximally high matching score for any percentage of edits. Under the LZJD interpretation of content similarity, we want the matching score to be similar to the percent of byte alterations performed. That is to say, if 25% of the bytes were altered in the target file, we want to see LZJD return a score of 100 (i.e., 100-25% = 75).
In examining the full results (see Appendix A), it is clear that sdhash performs best when we consider only the higher scores (≥ 55). It routinely obtains the lowest percentage of average changes, followed by LZJD, and then ssdeep. While ssdeep is the only method to obtain the most high scores (≥ 80), this is of little utility due to the small number of changes needed to reduce such scores. The robustness of LZJD becomes more apparent when we consider a score of ≥ 50, at which point LZJD requires twice as many byte edits to produce such a score compared to sdhash. Reducing LZJD to a score of ≥ 40 required altering 1.97% of the file, where sdhash produces a score of zero (no match) after an average of only 1.56% of the file is edited. The rate at which LZJD's score is lowered decreases with each byte edit, and so its performance advantage improves dramatically relative to sdhash and ssdeep as we move down in matching score. Reducing LZJD to a score of 25 required 11.0% of the bytes to be altered, which is 20 times greater than for sdhash. At the extreme end, reducing LZJD to a score of ≥ 10 requires editing almost half the file. The 77 matches at this level is lower than 100 because the random noise test couldn't get LZJD to produce a score that low for many files , and the FRASH test framework didn't anticipate a scenario where a score of 0 could not be obtained. This results in the FRASH code failing to count the files which obtained a score in the (25, 10) range, and could not be reduced to the [10, 0) before the test was forced to finish running by our modifications.
Fragment Test
In the fragment tests of FRASH, a portion of the each file is removed, and then the remaining fragment is searched for against the database of all complete file hashes. The size of the fragment starts at 95%, nearly the whole file, and decreases down to only a 1% portion of the original file. The motivation of these tests are to determine how small a fragment can be while still being matched with the source file. This scenario may occur with any storage or transport format where a file may be broken up into chunks, such as the fragment storage in a file system or individual packets in network traffic.
FRASH runs these fragmentation tests in two modes, one where the file has data removed from the end only (end cut), and one where a random portion of the file is removed from both the beginning and end of the file (random cut). In the former case, the fragment always starts as the same sequence of bytes but ends prematurely. In the latter case, the fragment is essentially a random portion of the file (and most likely from near the middle of the original file). The results of the fragment tests are presented in the next two tables. In each table, the File Size (%) is the size of the file fragment as a percentage of the original file it came from. The ssdeep algorithm is particularly vulnerable to this approach, and is significantly degraded in its ability to correctly match files by a fragment being just 50% of the original file size. Sdhash is more robust, and is not meaningfully impacted in matching ability until fragments are 5% of the original file size or less, where it starts to quickly degrade in accuracy. We also notice a confusing behavior in the average matched score produced by sdhash. In Table 10, the sdhash score slowly decreases from high 90s to low 90s, which is a reasonable behavior to expect as the fragment size decreases. However, in Table 9 , the sdhash score first decreases from the low 80s to the low 70s, and then begins increasing against back into the low 80s.
Compared to sdhash, LZJD obtains lower average matching scores. In Table 10 , these scores are nearly perfectly aligned with the interpretation of a similarity of X% indicating that the X% of the contents are the same. The scores returned for LZJD are a bit below this expectation in Table 9 , but still match the general trend. This can be explained by the LZSet construction process being sensitive to changes in the byte sequence, causing changes in the dictionary. In the case of Table 10 , corresponding to the end cut version of the fragment test, the start of the byte sequence will remain unchanged. This means the LZ set generated will also be generated in the same order, and will simply stop early once the fragment comes to a premature end. This results in a high quality match of LZ set contents when computing the Jaccard similarity. In the random cut case of Table 9 , the beginning of the file has been removed.
This changes the set of sub-sequences computed by the LZ approach, resulting in a lowered match. However the match is still robust, as evident by the high number of matches LZJD obtained.
We claim that this robustness is the more important property. The fragment results support the conclusion that LZJD is more robust in its ability to match small fragments to their source files compared to ssdeep and sdhash. In all cases, LZJD is either tied with or better than sdhash at this task. Even down to 1% fragment sizes, LZJD is able to match 99% of fragments to their source file. In comparison, sdhash is only able to match just under 60% of fragments.
Adjusted LZJD Scoring for Fragment Searching
If an analyst were to use LZJD in this fragment scenario, where it is known that we have a α byte long file fragment that we want to compare against a known (larger) file of length β, it may then be reasonable to use an adjusted scoring of sim(α, β) · β/α to adjust for the fact that our expected similarity should not generally exceed the ratio of the differences in file length (i.e., α/β).
Alignment Test
One area of weakness for many similarity hash functions is padding inserted at the beginning of a file. Ssdeep in particular is weak in this scenario [40] , and may be a weakness for many bloom-filter based hashes. The alignment test in FRASH is designed for this scenario, and inserts random bytes into the beginning of a file, and then attempts to match it back against the full database. An analysis of the LZSet algorithm used by LZJD may also lead one to assume that LZJD is susceptible to this same problem. Because the LZSet is built incrementally, sequences seen earlier can impact the dictionary, changing what is captured in the later sections of the byte sequence. The results of this section will show that while this could be a problem for LZJD in the limit, the performance on the FRASH tests indicate that its matching ability is not hampered by this scenario.
The FRASH tests for matching in-spite of excess padding is run in two modes. One where a fixed number of bytes are added to the file, and the other where a fixed percentage of the original file size is added to the front. The results for the latter scenario are presented in Table 11 . We present only the percentage results as they are the most aggressive and challenging version of the test.
As expected, we can see that ssdeep is significantly impacted by the front-padding of the binary, and can only match 3% of files when 300% of the file size is padded to the front. Both sdhash and LZJD are able to match 100% of files in the tested range. We also see that the scores for both are negatively impacted by the addition of the bytes to the front of the file. For sdhash, the scores are in the high 60s instead of the normal 80s-90s that it is able to achieve in the other benchmarks. Because there is no particular interpretation that applies to the sdhash score, we can not offer any analysis as to cause or reason. For LZJD, we would expect a score in the range of 1/(1 + x/100), where x is the percent of the file size added as padding. In each case, the LZJD score is one third to one half of this expected value. This can be explained by the Lempel-Ziv encoding scheme, which creates a maximal number of entries in the set when presented with high entropy (i.e., random looking) data. Because the x% of bytes added by FRASH are random, this will create disproportionately more entires in the LZ set, and thus become a larger portion of the hash digest. The effect is that there will be considerably more than x% new hashes added to the set, with the amount more being dependent upon the normal entropy of the file under consideration. Because these entries in the hash are from random sub-sequences, they are unlikely to appear in another file, and so they are not matched and the score is reduced.
Discussion
At this point we have performed extensive testing of LZJD compared to ssdeep and sdhash. It is faster to hash, faster at hash comparisons, produces more compact hashes, and provides higher matching accuracy for smaller files, compared to these previous tools. Only ssdeep is faster at hashing and has smaller digests, but its matching ability is not sufficient for the multitude of file types in the t5 corpus. This coalesces to a strong argument for the use of LZJD as an alternative to ssdeep and sdhash for digital forensic applications. The faster comparison time and accuracy combined will allow LZJD to be used in real deployments with databases larger than what either ssdeep or sdhash can handle, while stemming a natural increase in false positives due to the use of larger datasets. This runtime advantage is critical for tool adoption, as practitioners would be unlikely to make use of a tool that did not produce timely results.
The most significant difference between LZJD and prior similarity digests is the nature of the score produced. Most digests, including ssdeep and sdhash, produce mostly heuristic scores. The threshold for what a "significant" score is must be determined by experimentation, and may change for different file types. While this is undesirable on the surface, it can be argued that the nature could be intuitive to practitioners. Once one obtains a score from sdhash, the only needed consideration is if the score passes the user's threshold of significance. However, we have also seen how this design can lead to undesirable failure cases, as occurred with our Android malware in subsection 3.1, where sdhash consistently obtained high and confident (mostly perfect 100 scores) false positives on the dataset.
In contrast, LZJD's score is more interpretable, measuring the content similarity of the files. We noted in section 2 that LZJD's score can be loosely interpreted as the percentage of shared byte contents between files. The extensive experiments provided by the FRASH framework in section 4 partially support this conclusion. The sensitivity of the LZSet method to changes in the byte sequence causes a score lower than this interpretation would suggest. Based on these results, we can recommend treating LZJD's score as a lower bound on the percent of similar byte contents between files. This interpretation can be reached by noting that the FRASH tests generally alter a fixed percentage of the files, and by comparing LZJD's score to this percentage, LZJD consistently obtains a score equal to or less than this expected percentage. This is still a useful interpretable score, but does require more thought on the practitioner's part to determine what a significant score is. For example, when byte sequences of dramatically different lengths are compared, we will naturally expect LZJD to return a lower score, even if the smaller byte sequence is lifted directly from the larger one. This is due to the fact that LZJD uses the entire file when computing and comparing similarity. The FRASH results indicate though that LZJD is far superior to ssdeep and sdhash in accurately matching a file fragment to its source file, even when LZJD does not produce as large of a score for the match. We believe this robustness will make up for the additional consideration that may be needed on the practitioner's part.
To our knowledge, there has yet to be any discussion on what the ideal scoring approach would be for a similarity digest. Our results open an opportunity to discuss such potential design choices. In particular, should scores indicate a level of similarity, or a level of commonality? By this we mean, should scores be interpretable as a measure of how much content of two files are shared in aggregate (as LZJD currently does)? Or should scores reflect that two byte sequences share some commonality, such as being from the same file or how much one file could be subsumed by another (as sdhash does)? For LZJD, we have already given one instance in which its design could be modified to reflect a preference for commonality when searching for the source of a file fragment (see our ending discussion in subsubsection 4.2.3). There may also be other goals toward which one could design a similarity digest, but leave further discussion of this question for future work.
Another advantage of the LZJD approach, which we have not tested in this work, is further scaling abilities of the digest hash. Because the LZJD hash produces a valid distance metric, it is possible to use metric indexes to prune distance computations from a search [38, 36] . Further speedups can be obtained by performing partial digest comparisons. Because the LZJD hash is obtained by selecting the k smallest hash values, every LZJD digest of length k contains the k digest ∀k < k. This gives a natural way to balance between speed and accuracy. We leave exploring these options to future work.
Conclusions
The Lempel-Ziv Jaccard Distance was introduced to address problems in malware classification, but we have shown that it has significant utility as a similarity digest for digital forensic applications. Compared to existing tools, such as sdhash, LZJD offers a non-heuristic score that can be interpreted by the user as the amount of byte similarity between two files. Beyond this property, LZJD is more robust in its ability to match file fragments to their source, even when forced to match a fragment on the order of 1% of the original file's size. We have also shown that LZJD can be made practical from a speed perspective, with digest comparison over 60 times faster than sdhash's, and hashing time 34% faster. This will allow the use of larger search databases than is possible with other tools, while also being more accurate. In the interest of tool adoption, we have released an open-source implementation that mimics sdhash's command line options. This should allow LZJD to be easily integrated with existing work-flows for fast adoption by practitioners.
In these tables, we show the average block size percentage as the Size column. The associated average block size can be computed from these tables by multiplying the total block size of the table, with the percentage given in each column. The SCB tests were run for 50 trials each. This covers the results in Table A The full results from the random noise test are given in Table A . 15 . The Change column is the average percent of bytes in the filed that needed to be edited for a score of that value to be obtained, and Match is the number of files that FRASH was able to successfully reduce to the given score range. The most robust method for each score is shown in bold. The default spacing used in FRASH is 10, but we reduced the spacing to 5 to take advantage of LZJD's performance of LZJD. The high resitance of LZJD meant that a zero value was never produced, which did not interact well with FRASH's execution. The second to last row shows that for 7 of the 100 files, a match score in the range of [1, 5) was produced by modifying an average of 32% of the file. This value is artificially low, as almost all tests were stopped prematurely before LZJD even reached a score of 15. Tables Table A.16 and Table A .17 are the complete version of Table 9 and Table 10 respectively. The Size column is the percent file size. We can see that when LZJD and Sdhash don't get every match, LZJD always has more matches. It is also more clear that Sdhash's performance degrades at around 5% and drops quickly, where LZJD is more robust in being able to still hit matches. 
